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Abstract
I study the welfare effect of automation on workers in a setting where technology is complementary but imperfect. Using a modified task-based framework, I argue that imperfect complementary automation can impose non-pecuniary costs on workers via a behavioral channel. The
theoretical model suggests that a critical factor determining the welfare effect of imperfect complementary automation is the automatability of the production process. I confirm the model’s
predictions in an experiment that elicits subjects’ revealed preference for automation. Increasing
automatability leads to a significant increase in the demand for automation. I explore additional
drivers of the demand for automation using machine learning analysis and textual analysis of
choice reasons. The analysis reveals that task enjoyment, performance, and cognitive flexibility
are the most important predictors of subjects’ choices. There is significant heterogeneity in how
subjects evaluate imperfect complementary automation. I discuss the implications of my results
for workers’ welfare, technology adoption, and inequality.
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Introduction

Automation is one of the most important trends in the labor market that will have a long-lasting
impact on firms, workers, and public policies.1 This trend has initiated a growing literature in economics that studies the market-level effects of automation. The existing literature seeks to provide
both a theoretical account of the potential implications of automation for growth and labor share
(Frey and Osborne, 2017; Brynjolfsson, Rock, and Syverson, 2017; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018b,
2019; Agrawal, Gans, and Goldfarb, 2019), as well as estimates of the contemporary effects of automation on the labor markets in the US and Europe (Goos, Manning, and Salomons, 2014; Autor,
2015; Lordan and Neumark, 2018; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2020). What the existing analysis tends
to be missing, however, is the account of the micro-level, or behavioral, effects of automation.2 How
would it feel to work alongside a robot? How would it change the work environment? How would
it change the incentives that workers face? These are equally important questions to answer given
that an ever-increasing number of workers have to deal with automation in their workplaces. Answering these questions is necessary to get a complete picture of the potential effects of automation
on workers’ welfare and inequality.
I study the behavioral effects of automation in the workplace in a setting where automation
technology is complementary to workers’ skills. I argue that automation is not always beneficial
for workers in this case, despite the common belief. My argument proceeds in two ways. First,
I develop a theoretical model and use it to identify the conditions under which complementary
automation benefits or hurts workers. Second, I conduct an experiment to empirically analyze the
behavioral effects of automation and test the model’s predictions. To the best of my knowledge,
the present study provides the first causal evidence on the behavioral effects of complementary
automation. I show that in some instances, complementary automation will reduce workers’ welfare.
Complementary automation can also make welfare inequality among different types of workers more
pronounced. Having identified these issues, I propose several mechanisms to compensate workers
for the adverse effects of automation.
My focus on complementary automation is motivated by the emerging consensus that whether
1

Automation is, of course, not a new phenomenon. It has been occurring in waves throughout history. See Mokyr,
Vickers, and Ziebarth (2015) for an overview of automation in a historical context.
2
While the studies of the behavioral effects of automation in the workplace begin to emerge (Corgnet, HernánGonzález, and Mateo, 2018; Granulo, Fuchs, and Puntoni, 2019), the evidence is still relatively scarce.
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automation will benefit or hurt workers depends on whether automation complements or substitutes
their skills (Autor, 2015; Agrawal, Gans, and Goldfarb, 2019). Automation that substitutes workers’
skills will ultimately displace workers and reduce their welfare. Automation that complements
workers’ skills, on the other hand, should make workers more productive, which in turn should
lead to higher wages and overall welfare. I ask if it is always true that complementary automation
increases workers’ welfare. I argue that the answer to this question is not always affirmative. The
key reason why complementary automation might not always be beneficial for workers is that new
technologies are often imperfect (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2019).
A recent example of such complementary but imperfect automation comes from Walmart. In
2019, Walmart began expanding the use of cleaning robots in their stores to speed up cleaning. The
company executives claimed that the addition of such robots would free employees from routine
work and allow them to focus on more meaningful tasks. In reality, however, employees were
infuriated about this new work environment. The employees were complaining that they had to
manage a more tedious task under this new environment—babysitting robots by correcting their
errors. For example, robots would often be stuck somewhere and send text messages to employees
with requests of help.3
My theoretical model formalizes the intuition behind the Walmart example. On the one hand,
automation is complementary, which allows workers to perform new better tasks and benefits them.4
On the other hand, automation is imperfect in the sense that workers occasionally have to go back
to old tasks and babysit the robot. Babysitting creates a task-switching environment and imposes
non-pecuniary costs on workers via a behavioral channel.5 The trade-off between these costs and
benefits determines the net welfare effect of automation.6 My modeling approach draws inspiration
from the task-based framework (Zeira, 1998; Autor, Levy, and Murnane, 2003; Acemoglu and Autor,
3

See, e.g., Kristin Houser (https://futurism.com/grouchy-employee-hates-walmart-robots), Drew Harwell (https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/06/06/walmart-turns-robots-its-human-workers-who-feellike-machines/).
4
In the terminology of Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018b), automation technology combines the process of the
displacement of labor and new task creation.
5
The negative effects of multitasking and task-switching are well-documented in the economics (Holmstrom and
Milgrom, 1991; Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole, 1999; Coviello, Ichino, and Persico, 2014) and psychology (Spector
and Biederman, 1976; Kiesel et al., 2010; Vandierendonck, Liefooghe, and Verbruggen, 2010) literatures. On the
other hand, some studies in organizational psychology document positive effects of task variety for some workers
(Zaniboni, Truxillo, and Fraccaroli, 2013). I revisit this latter possibility when I analyze subjects’ stated reasons for
their choices.
6
The costs and benefits here are viewed from the subjective perspective of workers. These costs and benefits will
likely be distinct from the costs and benefits of automation from a firm’s perspective.
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2011; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018a) by assuming that the production process consists of a series of
tasks assigned to an agent. However, a significant difference is that I allow tasks to differ along two
dimensions: type and difficulty. My modeling of the task-switching environment is different from
the approach taken in the principal-agent literature (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Dewatripont,
Jewitt, and Tirole, 1999) in the sense that tasks are assigned sequentially and switching between
task types is costly. The model highlights that a critical factor determining the net welfare effect
of automation is the automatability of the environment, or how well the production process is
suited for automation. I show that if automatability exceeds a certain threshold, the net effect of
automation will be positive, and vice versa. I derive the comparative statics for the demand for
automation in terms of the parameters of the work environment and agents’ characteristics, which
allows me to test the model’s predictions experimentally.
The experiment elicits subjects’ revealed preference for automation since one cannot directly
observe the welfare effect of automation. I use a choice-from-experience design (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Hertwig and Erev, 2009) in which subjects first experience two types of technologies,
manual and automatic, and then choose the technology they prefer. Under manual technology, subjects work on their own. Under the automatic technology, subjects work with the computer. The
computer allows subjects to work on a new task and earn more money, but occasionally it requires
babysitting. The experimental task combines the elements of the real-effort framework with the
task-switching framework (Kiesel et al., 2010; Vandierendonck, Liefooghe, and Verbruggen, 2010).
Subjects’ choices are incentivized, such that the choice of technology has real consequences for the
payoffs that they earn. The primary outcome of interest is the aggregate preference, or demand,
for the automatic technology. My primary treatment variable is the automatability of the environment. The experimental results confirm that automatability has a positive and significant causal
effect on the demand for automation.
I supplement the causal analysis of treatment effects with an exploratory machine learning analysis in which I ask which subjects’ characteristics could further explain the observed variation in
choices. I consider a comprehensive suite of potential predictors, including demographics, personality traits, risk and time preferences, and task performance. To avoid overfitting, I use the Lasso
estimator, a standard tool in machine learning that is gaining popularity in economics (Varian,
2014; Mullainathan and Spiess, 2017). The results show that the strongest predictors of subjects’
3

choices are measures of task enjoyment, performance, and cognitive flexibility.
In addition to the quantitative analysis of subjects’ choices, I conduct a qualitative analysis
by eliciting the reasons behind choices. Subjects provide their answers as a free-form text, which
is then classified. Many of the stated reasons can be mapped into the motivations suggested by
the theoretical model. However, some of the responses yield unexpected results. For example,
some subjects indicate that they enjoy a task-switching environment, which suggests that they
experience a positive effect of task variety instead of an adverse effect of task switching.7 These
results, together with the overall variation in subjects’ choices, suggest that the benefits and costs
of automation are likely to be heterogeneous.
I draw two broad policy implications from my analysis. The first policy implication is that
the welfare effect of complementary automation is more complicated than suggested by the current
literature. I show that if automation is imperfect, it will generate non-pecuniary costs for workers,
which can potentially outweigh the benefits. My theoretical results clarify the conditions under
which complementary automation benefits or hurts workers. These conditions can help companies
implement automation in the workplace and policymakers to regulate the adoption of automation
technology. The second implication is that different types of workers might benefit differently from
complementary automation. The adoption of the automation technology will likely create winners
and losers even in the complementary case, which will lead to an even greater welfare inequality
among workers. Identifying which types of workers benefit more or less from automation and testing
the effectiveness of the compensation mechanisms proposed by the theoretical model are promising
avenues for further research.

Related Literature
Corgnet, Hernán-González, and Mateo (2018) study the effect of automation on social incentives
in the workplace using an incentivized lab experiment. They show that replacing a human team
member with a robot results in a reduction in performance of the remaining human team members.
The negative effect of the human-robot replacement is attributed to reduced social incentives.
7

The absence of task variety and resulting drudgery is a major issue in many low-skill occupations, e.g., warehouse work. Amazon, among other companies, is attempting to combat this issue using the gamification of the
work process. See, e.g., Greg Bensinger (https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/05/21/missionracerhow-amazon-turned-tedium-warehouse-work-into-game/).
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Social pressure and envy are highlighted as the key social incentives that drive their results.
Granulo, Fuchs, and Puntoni (2019) use surveys to gauge preferences for the replacement of a
human worker by either another worker or a robot. A respondent’s perspective is manipulated by
framing the question such that the worker who is being replaced is either the respondent or a third
person. They find that the respondents’ stated preferences depend on the perspective. Respondents
would prefer a worker to be replaced by another worker, if the worker who is being replaced is a
third person. However, respondents would prefer a worker to be replaced by a robot, if the worker
who is being replaced is the respondent. These results are attributed to the differences in perceived
self-threat and future work concerns associated with each replacement option and perspective.
Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018a,b, 2019, 2020) develop a task-based framework8 to analyze the
effects of automation on the labor market and use the framework to empirically evaluate these
effects in the US context. Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018a,b) use a task-based framework to analyze
the effects of new technologies, such as automation, on the labor market. The key idea of their
framework is to represent a production process as a set of tasks that can be assigned either to labor
or capital. This framework allows for new technologies, such as automation, that are different from
the standard factor-augmenting technologies. The authors then analyze different potential effects
of these new technologies on the labor market and identify the conditions under which the labor
market outcomes will deteriorate or improve. Acemoglu and Restrepo (2020) empirically evaluate
the effect of robots on local labor markets in the US. Local labor markets with great exposure
to robots are shown to have worse outcomes in terms of employment and wages. The effect of
robotization is separated from other competing effects, such as offshoring and greater exposure to
foreign imports. Acemoglu and Restrepo (2019) analyze the evolution of labor demand in the US
using the task-based framework. The framework allows them to decompose the overall changes
in labor demand into a variety of effects. Changes to the task content of production are claimed
to play an important role in shaping labor demand. Their findings suggest that in recent decades
the process of automation has been accelerating while the process of new tasks creation has been
decelerating.
Aghion, Jones, and Jones (2017) develop a model of economic growth in the presence of automation technologies. They use their growth model to study the effects of automation on industrial
8

Their framework is based on Acemoglu and Autor (2011), Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003), and Zeira (1998).
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organization and wage inequality. A key feature of their model is the introduction of Baumol’s
“cost decease” argument, predicting the existence of bottlenecks in automation. This argument
suggests that economic growth is likely to be constrained not by sectors with high productivity
growth, but rather by sectors that are hard to improve. One of the implications of the model is
that, even in the presence of automation, the share of labor in production will not be driven to
zero.
Agrawal, Gans, and Goldfarb (2019) discuss the potential labor market effects of new technologies in a specific context of prediction and decision-making tasks. They focus on machine learning,
and related automation of prediction tasks, and ask how these changes could affect labor market
outcomes. The key to their discussion is the effect of the automation of prediction tasks on the
relative returns of capital versus labor in decision-making tasks.
Frey and Osborne (2017) empirically analyze the likelihood of computerization for a large set of
occupations. They find that occupations related to service, sales, office and administrative support
have a high likelihood of being computerized. Occupations related to management, education,
engineering and healthcare have a relatively low likelihood of being computerized. The potential
effects of computerization on labor market outcomes in these occupations are discussed. A negative
relationship between the estimated likelihood of computerization and wage for a given occupation
is reported.

2

Theoretical Framework

In this section I develop a stylized model, which captures the trade-off associated with imperfect
complementary automation and elucidates the factors that affect this trade-off. My modeling
approach follows the task-based framework of Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018b) by assuming that
the production process consists of a series of tasks assigned to an agent. I model automation as a
technology that allows the agent to delegate some of the tasks to the robot (computer, machine).
Using the robot enables the agent to work on new tasks, which represents the complementarity
of automation. The imperfection of the automation technology is modeled as the inability of the
robot to complete certain tasks: the robot passes those tasks back to the agent, which creates
a multitasking (or task-switching) environment. The modeling of the multitasking environment,
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however, is different from the approach taken in the principal-agent literature (Holmstrom and
Milgrom, 1991; Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole, 1999), since in the present case the tasks are
assigned sequentially and switching between task types is costly.

2.1

Environment

Time is discrete and has two periods indexed by t ∈ {0, 1}. In each period an agent is assigned
a task. The first dimension along which tasks vary is type, ηt ∈ H = {A, B}. Tasks of different
types require different skills to complete them.9 The second dimension along which tasks vary is
difficulty, θt ∈ Θ = {l, h}. Tasks with higher difficulty require more effort to complete them. A
task is then represented by xt ∈ X = H × Θ. The agent exerts effort et ∈ R+ to complete a task.
The history of tasks and exerted effort up to period t is denoted χt .
The outcome of a task, success or failure, is deterministic conditional on exerted effort and the
characteristics of the task. The outcome is given by zt (xt , et ) ≡ z(xt , et | χt ) = 1(et > ēt (xt )). The
interpretation of ēt (xt ) ≡ ē(xt | χt ) is that it is an effort requirement for a task: the minimum
amount of effort needed to complete a task. The effort requirement evolves over time via a learningby-doing effect (Arrow, 1971).
Specifically, I assume that the effort requirement decreases after a repeated assignment of a task
of the same type:
ē1 (x1 ) = (ē0 (x1 ) − λ min{e0 , ē0 (x0 )} 1(η1 = η0 ))+ ,

(1)

where ē0 (x) > 0 denotes the initial effort requirement for task x.10 The assumption that switching
between task types results in a higher effort requirement is supported by the literature on a taskswitching paradigm in psychology (Spector and Biederman, 1976; Kiesel et al., 2010; Vandierendonck, Liefooghe, and Verbruggen, 2010). Parameter λ ∈ [0, 1] determines the strength of learning.
I choose an additive form of learning in favor of a more traditional power form of learning (Wright,
1936) for the sake of greater tractability: the case of full learning with λ = 1 allows one to significantly simplify some of the expressions. I denote the initial effort requirements for a task of
9

In contrast to the multitasking models in the principal-agent literature, task types do not have an alternative
interpretation of different work attributes, such as quantity and quality, since tasks are assigned sequentially.
10
Expression min{e0 , ē0 (x0 )} guarantees that the agent has no incentive to “store” effort across periods. The
exact meaning of this assumption will become clear when I turn to the optimal effort choice. The non-negativity
qualification, (·)+ ≡ max{·, 0}, guarantees that the effort requirement does not fall below zero.
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type A as al ≡ ē0 (Al), ah ≡ ē0 (Ah), and the difference as ∆a ≡ ah − al , with ah > al . I assume
that the effort requirement for a task of type B does not depend on difficulty, and denote it as
b ≡ ē0 (Bl) = ē0 (Bh).

2.2

Production Process

The production process can be organized using one of the two available technologies, or modes,
denoted as µ ∈ {A, M}, where A is an Automatic mode and M is a Manual mode. Modes determine
the task content of production, represented by the probability distribution of tasks P(xt | µ), as well
as payoffs to the agent. The task content of production in the Manual mode is

P(xt | M) =





p,




1 − p,






0,

xt = Al,
xt = Ah,

(2)

otherwise.

In the Manual mode the agent only works on tasks of type A. Parameter p ∈ [0, 1] determines the
frequency of easy tasks of this type. I refer to p as the automatability of the production process.
The task content of production is independent of history.
In the Automatic mode tasks Al are automated by a robot. The robot always successfully
completes tasks Al, however, it cannot complete tasks Ah, which represents an imperfection of the
automation technology. When task Ah arrives, it is always passed back to the agent. While the
robot works on task Al, the agent can work on a task of type B. The task content of production
in the Automatic mode is, therefore,

P(xt | A) =





p,




1 − p,






0,

xt = Bl,
xt = Ah,

(3)

otherwise.

The automatability of the environment affects the efficiency of the robot in the sense that the robot
can solve most of the tasks of type A in an environment with high p . However, automatability
is conceptually different from automation efficiency since automatability also affects the agent by
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changing the task content of production.
The agent’s payoff depends on the outcome of a task and mode: π(xt | zt , µ) = zt π(xt | µ). In
the Manual mode the payoff for the successful completion of a task is given by

π(xt | M) =




π A ,

xt ∈ {Al, Ah},



0,

otherwise.

For simplicity, I assume that the payoff depends only on a task type but not on difficulty.
In the Automatic mode the payoff for the successful completion of a task is given by

π(xt | A) =





πA + πB ,




πA,






0,

xt = Bl,
xt = Ah,
otherwise.

I assume that π A , π B ∈ R+ . The payoffs should be interpreted broadly as comprised of both
extrinsic monetary rewards and intrinsic utility (Benabou and Tirole, 2003). The extrinsic part
can represent a piece-rate incentive scheme, as well as a wage-plus-bonus incentive scheme in which
wage is conditional on satisfying work requirements. The increased payoff for a task of type B can
represent both a higher extrinsic reward due to greater productivity of the agent working with the
robot, as well as higher intrinsic utility if a task of type B is more desirable and prestigious than
a task of type A. For example, this would be the case if tasks of type A are routine and tasks of
type B are creative.

2.3

Preferences

The agent has preferences over payoffs π and effort e represented by a utility function ut : R+ ×R+ 7→
R. I make standard assumptions about the utility function: it is strictly increasing and concave
in payoffs, and strictly decreasing and concave in effort. I further assume that the utility function
takes a standard additively separable form: ut (π, e) = π − ct (e), where ct : R+ 7→ R+ is a cost
of effort function.11 I assume that ct is strictly increasing and convex, and that ct (0) = 0. These
11
The additively separable form, while being analytically convenient, is also somewhat restrictive because it does
not allow for complementarity or substitutability of effort and money in the utility function (Alekseev, 2020).
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assumptions imply that ct is superadditive: ct (e + ∆e) > ct (e) + ct (∆e). Superadditivity has an
intuitive interpretation. Suppose that e = al and ∆e = ∆a. Then superadditivity implies that
the agent finds it less demanding to complete an easy task followed by a hard task (assuming full
learning) rather than to complete a hard task by itself.
The cost function depends on the history via task-switching. I assume that switching to a
different task type in period 1 induces a switching cost s ∈ R+ that is added to the cost of effort:

c1 (e) = c0 (e) + s 1(η1 6= η0 ).

The switching cost can be interpreted as the loss of the agent’s utility due to psychological effects,
such as irritation or an activation of a costly cognitive control (Kiesel et al., 2010; Vandierendonck,
Liefooghe, and Verbruggen, 2010). This effect is conceptually different from the effect of task
switching on effort requirement via the learning channel (1). The agent’s utility of exerting effort
e on a task xt in period t is

U (e | xt , χt , µ) = π(xt | zt , µ) − ct (e) = 1(e > ēt (xt ))π(xt | µ) − ct (e).

I assume that the participation constraint is satisfied: π(xt | µ) > ct (ēt (xt )). There is no discounting
between the periods. The agent aggregates utilities across periods and states according to the
Expected Utility.

2.4

Optimal Choice

I now proceed to deriving the values of the Manual and Automatic modes to the agent, V (µ).
Since these values are conditional on the agent’s optimal behavior, I begin with the following
proposition.12
Proposition 1. The agent’s optimal effort on task x in period t is the effort requirement of task x
in that period.
This result is driven by two facts. First, the participation constraint makes it sub-optimal for
the agent to exert less effort than required because the agent can always get a strictly higher utility
12

All proofs and derivations are in Appendix A.
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by exerting exactly the effort required. Second, the learning process (1) caps the reduction of the
effort requirement that can be achieved by exerting effort in period 0. This prevents the agent
from “storing” effort by exerting higher-than-required effort in period 0 in order to lower the effort
requirement in period 1 even further and get higher utility. This result implies that the agent’s
value in period t is
U ∗ (xt , χt , µ) = π(xt | µ) − ct (ēt (xt )).
Figure 1 presents a scheme of state-contingent values in each period under the Manual mode.
Using this scheme, it is straightforward to compute the agent’s value of the Manual mode. The
value of the Manual mode under full learning, λ = 1, is13


V (M | λ = 1) = 2π A − pc0 (al ) + (1 − p)c0 (ah ) + p(1 − p)c0 (∆a) .

(4)

Figure 1: Scheme of Manual Mode
1−p

Ah
π A − c0 (ah − λah )

Ah
π A − c0 (ah )
1−p

p

p

1−p

Al
π A − c0 ((al − λah )+ )

Start
Ah
π A − c0 (ah − λal )

Al
π A − c0 (al )
p

t=0

Al
π A − c0 (al − λal )
t=1

Figure 2 presents a scheme of state-contingent values in each period under the Automatic mode.
The value of the Automatic mode under full learning is


V (A | λ = 1) = 2(π A + pπ B ) − p(2 − p)c0 (b) + (1 − p)(1 + p)c0 (ah ) + 2p(1 − p)s .

(5)

13
I focus on the case of full learning since it considerably simplifies some of the expressions. In Appendix A, I
derive the general results for an arbitrary value of λ.
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Comparing (5) to the value of the Manual mode with full learning (4) shows that the potential extra
payoff pπ B increases the value of the Automatic mode. The costs, however, are now different due
to a different task content of production, which reflects switching costs as well as reduced learning.
Figure 2: Scheme of Automatic Mode
1−p

Ah
π A − c0 (ah − λah )

Ah
π A − c0 (ah )
1−p

p

p

1−p

Bl
π A + π B − c0 (b) − s

Start
πA

Ah
− c0 (ah ) − s

Bl
π A + π B − c0 (b)
p

t=0

Bl
π A + π B − c0 (b − λb)
t=1

The next step is to determine the conditions under which the agent’s welfare is greater under the Automatic mode than in the Manual mode. These conditions will be equivalent to the
conditions under which the agent would prefer to work under the Automatic mode, if given an
option. The Automatic mode offers higher payoffs by allowing the agent to work on task B while
the robot handles task Al. On the other hand, the Automatic mode induces a costly task-switching
environment and slows down learning on tasks A. In a setting where the choice of technology is up
to the agent (e.g., the agent owns a stake in a firm), the agent’s preference will determine whether
the production process will be automated (i.e., capital-intensive) or not (i.e., labor-intensive). In
a setting when this choice is up to a principal, the agent’s preference will determine whether the
agent experiences a welfare gain or loss after the adoption of automation technology. The agent will
experience a welfare gain if a principal’s choice of technology coincides with the agent’s preference,
and a welfare loss if a principal’s choice differs from the agent’s preference.
The agent prefers the Automatic mode over the Manual mode if the value difference between
the two modes is non-negative, ∆V ≡ V (A) − V (M) > 0. The following result establishes the
conditions under which the agent prefers the Automatic mode over the Manual mode in the case
12

of full learning.
Proposition 2. Assume full learning (λ = 1). If condition

π B − c0 (b) 6 s +

c0 (ah ) − c0 (al ) − c0 (∆a)
2

(6)

holds, then there exists a unique threshold automatability p∗ ∈ [0, 1) such that the agent will prefer
the Automatic mode if p > p∗ and the Manual mode if p < p∗ . The threshold automatability is
given by
p∗ = 1 −

2π B − c0 (b) + c0 (al )
.
c0 (ah ) + c0 (b) − c0 (∆a) + 2s

(7)

If condition (6) does not hold, the agent will always prefer the Automatic mode.
This result highlights an important and intuitive interplay between the benefits and costs of
imperfect complementary automation, on the one hand, and the automatability of the environment,
on the other hand. Consider condition (6). The left-hand-side of this condition is the utility of the
new task net of the effort cost. The right-hand-side of this condition is the sum of the switching cost
and half of the term that I call the learning cost. Superadditivity of the cost function ensures that
the learning cost is positive. The interpretation of condition (6) is that the net utility of the new
task enabled by automation has to be less than the total costs (switching plus learning) imposed
by automation. If this condition holds, then the automatability of the environment determines the
agent’s preference. If automatability is high enough, the agent will prefer the Automatic mode. If
automatability is low enough, the agent would be better off under the Manual mode. However, if
condition (6) does not hold and the net utility of the new task exceeds the costs of automation,
then the agent’s welfare will be always higher under the Automatic mode.
Even though there is a unique value at which ∆V changes its sign, the value difference is not
monotonic in p. The value difference is proportional to p(p − p∗ ), which implies that ∆V decreases
in p on the interval [0, p∗ /2] and increases on [p∗ /2, 1]. The value difference is negative and reaches
a unique minimum at p∗ /2. Figure 3a illustrates this point.
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Figure 3: Effect of Automatability
(a) Value Difference
1.0

Automatic Preferred

Demand

Value difference

Manual Preferred

(b) Demand for Automation

0.5

0

0

p∗ /2

p∗

1

0

Automatabiliy

p∗0

1
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Note: The left panel plots ∆V as a function of p. The vertical line corresponds to a threshold automatability
p∗ . In environments to the right of p∗ the Automatic mode is preferred. In environments to the left of p∗
the Manual mode is preferred. The right panel plots the demand for automation as a function of p. The
vertical line corresponds to the threshold automatability for the average agent, p∗0 . In environments to the
right of p∗0 the Automatic mode is chosen more than half of the time. In environments to the left of p∗0 the
Automatic mode is chosen less than half of the time.

2.5

Empirical Content

The main outcome of interest—the agent’s welfare—is unobservable, which makes theoretical predictions about the comparative statics of welfare untestable. To derive testable predictions, one
has to focus on observable outcomes, such as choices. Suppose that we observe a sample of choices,
{yi }ni=1 , made by n agents. Each agent makes a choice between either the Automatic (yi = 1) or
Manual (yi = 0) mode. I assume that agents are heterogeneous, and their only source of heterogeneity is the switching cost. In particular, the switching cost for each agent is normally distributed
with mean s0 and standard deviation σ:

si = s0 + σi ,

where i terms are independent and identically distributed according to a standard normal distribution. An agent chooses the Automatic mode if the value difference, ∆Vi , is positive. This leads
to the following result.
Proposition 3. Assume full learning (λ = 1). The probability that agent i chooses the Automatic
14

mode is

P(yi = 1) = Φ



1 2π B − c0 (b) + c0 (al )
h
+ c0 (∆a) − c0 (b) − c0 (a ) − 2s0 ,
2σ
1−p

(8)

if p ∈ (0, 1). For p ∈ {0, 1}, P(yi = 1) = 1.
Expression (8) can also be rewritten as

Φ

(c0 (ah ) + c0 (b) − c0 (∆a) + 2s0 )(p − p∗0 )
2σ(1 − p)


,

where
p∗0 ≡ 1 −

2π B − c0 (b) + c0 (al )
c0 (ah ) + c0 (b) − c0 (∆a) + 2s0

is the threshold automatability for the average agent. If p = p∗0 , the probability of choosing the
Automatic mode will be exactly 1/2. In environments to the left (respectively, to the right) of p∗0
the probability of choosing the Automatic mode will be less (respectively, greater) than 1/2.
Let dA = E yi = P(yi = 1) be the demand for automation, i.e., the expected proportion of
agents who choose the Automatic mode. The demand for automation depends on automatability,
the parameters of the switching cost distribution, learning, as well as on the payoffs and effort
requirements for tasks, dA (p, s0 , σ, λ, π B , b, ah , al ). The following result summarizes the comparative
statics for the demand. Since these results are in terms of an observable quantity—demand—they
can be tested empirically.14
Proposition 4. The demand for automation
1. Increases in automatability, p
2. Decreases in the mean switching cost, s0
3. Increases in the standard deviation of the switching cost, σ, for p < p∗0 and decreases in σ for
p > p∗0
14
Note, however, that since choices reflect value differences, the comparative statics for choices also reflect the
comparative statics for the aggregate value difference for all agents.
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4. Increases in learning, λ, iff
p
p l
bc00 (b − λb) > ah c00 (al − λah ) 1(al > λah ) + al c00 (ah − λal ) +
a c0 (al − λal )
1−p
1−p

(9)

5. Increases in the payoff for task B, π B
6. Decreases in the effort requirement for task B, b
7. Decreases in the effort requirement for task Ah, ah
8. Increases in the effort requirement for task Al, al iff
c00 (al )
p
+ c00 (al − λah ) 1(al > λah ) +
(1 − λ)c00 (al − λal ) > λc00 (ah − λal ).
1−p
1−p

(10)

Increasing automatability leads to an increase in the number of agents for whom automatability
is greater than the threshold (7), p > p∗i , raising the demand for automation. Figure 3b illustrates
the effect of automatability on demand. Increasing the mean switching cost shifts the distribution of
switching costs to the right. As a result of this right shift, the value of the Automatic mode decreases
for all agents, which reduces the demand for automation. Increasing the variance of switching costs
flattens the demand curve as a function of automatability (see Figure 3b). For p < p∗0 the demand
approaches 1/2 from below and for p > p∗0 the demand approaches 1/2 from above as σ increases.
In the extreme case of σ → ∞ the demand will be equal to 1/2 for any p ∈ (0, 1). The effect of
learning depends, among other things, on the effort requirement for task B. Condition (9) shows
that if b is high enough the effect of learning on the demand for automation will be positive. Since
learning affects both types of tasks, increasing b results in benefits from learning on task B in the
Automatic mode that are greater than the learning costs of task A. However, if b is not too high,
e.g., b = al , condition (9) will not hold and the effect of learning on the demand will be negative.
Increasing the payoff for task B increases the value of the Automatic mode for all agents and
thus raises the demand for automation. Increasing the effort requirement for task B has the opposite
effect: it decreases the value of the Automatic mode and reduces the demand. Increasing the effort
requirement for task Ah increases the learning costs and hence leads to a decrease in the demand
for automation. The effect of the effort requirement for task Al works through learning. If λ = 0,
16

condition (10) will be satisfied and the effect of al will be positive, since in the case of no learning
increasing al simply reduces the value of the Manual mode. On the other hand, if λ 6= 0 and ah is
high enough, condition (10) will not be satisfied and the effect of al will be negative.

3

Experiment

3.1

Procedures and Sample

The experiment was conducted in June–September 2019 at the ESI Lab at Chapman University.
A total of 128 subjects participated in the experiment over the course of 8 sessions. Subjects in the
experiment were undergraduate students at Chapman university who signed up for participation
in economic experiments and accepted e-mail invitations. None of the subjects had previously
experienced decision-making in an environment similar to the present experiment. Slightly more
than half of the subjects, 59%, were female.15 The average age was just above 21 years old. The
majority of the subjects, 52%, identified themselves as White, while 24% self-identified as Asian,
and 12% self-identified as Hispanic.
At the start of a session, an experimenter gave an overview of the experiment and answered
questions. After subjects indicated that they had no outstanding questions about the general structure of the experiment, they proceeded to reading on-screen instructions that provided the details
of the experiment.16 The instructions were followed by practice rounds and the experimental task.
The experiment concluded with a questionnaire and payments. The experiment was conducted on
computers and programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
Subjects made their decisions privately and did not communicate with each other. An independent assistant made cash payments at the end of each session. The final payoff for each subject
consisted of a show-up fee, a payment for the experimental task, and a payment for belief elicitation. The payoffs ranged between $21.25 and $50 with an average of $29.76, which included the $7
show-up fee. It took subjects 55 minutes, on average, to complete the experiment.
15
16

See Table D.1 in Appendix D for the detailed demographic characteristics of the sample.
See Appendix B for subjects’ instructions.
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3.2

Experimental Task

The experimental task consisted of three phases. In the first two phases subjects experienced
the Manual and Automatic modes. In the third phase subjects were given an option to choose
the mode they preferred. The chosen mode is the main outcome of interest in the experiment.
After subjects made their choices, they experienced the chosen mode again. The experimental task
was designed to mimic the environment of the theoretical model. In particular, the task induced
the salient trade-off between higher monetary benefits and higher costs in the Automatic mode.
The salience of the switching and learning costs associated with the task-switching environment in
the Automatic mode was the primary consideration in adopting the choice-from-experience design
rather than the choice-from-description design (Hertwig and Erev, 2009).

Manual Mode
In the Manual mode, subjects were working on a real-effort task called the Encryption task. The
Encryption task involves matching elements from one set to elements in another set according to
a matching rule. This real-effort task is widely adopted in the literature (Cason, Gangadharan,
and Nikiforakis, 2011; Charness, Masclet, and Villeval, 2014; Erkal, Gangadharan, and Koh, 2018).
In the present implementation, subjects had to match three-digit numbers to Latin letters.17 The
matching rule (or the key) for the task showed the correct matches between letters and numbers
and always contained 18 letter-number pairs. The key remained constant across rounds within a
given phase but changed across phases. The constant key was implemented to induce the possibility
of learning (Benndorf, Rau, and Sölch, 2018), since over time subjects could memorize the key and
spend less effort on solving the task (Joy, Kaplan, and Fein, 2004).
In each round, subjects’ had to type in the numbers that matched randomly picked letters from
the key. Subjects had to match either three or six letters. Rounds in which subjects had to match
three (respectively, six) letters are referred to as easy (respectively, hard ) rounds.18 The sequence of
easy and hard rounds was completely random and different for each subject. A computer determined
whether the round would be easy or hard before the start of each round, according to a given value
17

See Figure C.1 in Appendix C for a sample screenshot.
Experimental instructions did not use terms “easy” and “hard” in the task description to avoid priming. Instead,
different rounds were referred to as having either a “3-item lock” or a “6-item lock.”
18
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of automatability. Subjects received a piece-rate of $0.25 for each correctly solved round, regardless
of a round’s difficulty. A round counted as correctly solved if all the letters were matched according
to the key. After submitting their solutions for a given round, subjects proceeded to the next round
regardless of whether the solution was correct or not.
There was no local (within a round) or global (within a phase) time constraint on task completion. Subjects could spend as much time on the task as they wished.19 While imposing time
constraints in real-effort tasks is common in the literature (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Abeler
et al., 2011; Gill and Prowse, 2012), time constraints were undesirable in the present design. An
unconstrained design allows one to observe effort, as proxied by a response time (Spiliopoulos and
Ortmann, 2018), and under certain assumptions to estimate both ability and motivation on the
task (Alekseev, 2019). Observing effort was important in the present design since the theoretical
model suggests that effort is one of the determinants of the demand for automation. The length of
the Manual mode was determined by a fixed number of rounds, which was set to 50.

Automatic Mode
The Automatic mode differed from the Manual mode in that a computer solved easy, but not hard,
rounds of the Encryption task for subjects. The computer always solved easy rounds correctly and
took 10 seconds to do that. This amount of time was calibrated to match the average response
time in easy rounds of the Encryption task. The theoretical model does not feature round duration,
however, adopting it was necessary to induce a salient task-switching environment.
While the computer was solving easy rounds of the Encryption task, subjects were given an
opportunity to work on an alternative real-effort task called the Counting task. The Counting
task involves counting specified elements from a given set of elements and is another popular realeffort task in the literature (Abeler and Marklein, 2017; Abeler et al., 2011). Importantly, the
Counting task requires skills that are different from the skills required by the Encryption task,
which should induce switching costs. In the present implementation, subjects’ had to count the
19

The self-paced nature of the experiment was clearly communicated to the subjects during the instruction phase.
Additional care was taken to ensure that subjects who finished early did not disturb the subjects who were still
working. While it might appear that the absence of time constraints could lead to unreasonable times in the lab, this
was not the case. The longest time spent in the lab by a single subject was 102 minutes, well below the two hours
allocated for the experiment. Since subjects have intrinsic costs of their time, spending indefinite time in the lab is
not optimal.
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number of happy faces in a grid of happy and frowny faces.20 The dimensions of the grid were
always 4 × 5 elements. The number and location of happy and frowny faces was randomized in each
round and was different for every subject. The number of happy faces varied between 5 and 15.
The size of the grid was calibrated such that the average response time in the Counting task would
match the average response time in easy rounds of the Encryption task. This was done to ensure
that subjects have a chance to solve a round of a Counting task while the computer is working on
an easy round of the Encryption task.
Figure 4 visualizes the timing of events in the Automatic mode. If a subject completed a round
of the Counting task before the computer solved an easy round of the Encryption task, a new
round of the Counting task appeared. If the computer solved an easy round of the Encryption task
before the subject completed a round of the Counting task, one of the two scenarios was possible.
First, the computer determined whether the next round of the Encryption task would be easy or
hard. If the computer determined the next round to be easy, the computer silently proceeded
to working on that round, and the subject continued working on the Counting task for at least
another 10-second period. If the computer determined the next round to be hard, the computer
interrupted the subject’s work on the Counting task and presented the subject with a hard round
of the Encryption task.21 After the subject completed a hard round of the Encryption task, the
computer determined the next round’s difficulty, and so on.
As in the Manual mode, the Encryption task did not have local or global time constraints for
subjects, but had a fixed number of rounds, 50. Unlike in the Encryption task, the number of rounds
in the Counting task was unlimited, though there was a certain time constraint. Subjects could
complete as many rounds of the Counting task as possible during the time a computer was solving
easy rounds of the Encryption task. The Automatic mode finished when the last round of the
Encryption task was completed either by a subject or a computer. Subjects received a piece-rate of
$0.25 for each correctly solved round of the Counting task, as well as for each correctly solved round
of the Encryption task, including the rounds completed by the computer. This implementation
of the higher monetary benefits in the Automatic mode relative to the Manual mode was chosen
because it makes transparent for the subjects that they can never earn less money in the Automatic
20
21

See Figures C.2 in Appendix C for a sample screenshot.
See Figures C.3 in Appendix C for a sample screenshot.
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Figure 4: Structure of Automatic Mode
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mode than in the Manual mode.22

3.3

Feedback and Incentive Mechanism

Subjects did not receive feedback on their performance neither after each round nor after each phase.
Subjects received the feedback, which included the number of correctly solved rounds in both tasks
and total earnings in each phase, only at the end of the experiment. The after-phase feedback
was omitted for two reasons. The first reason was to have an opportunity to elicit subjects’ beliefs
about their overall (i.e., in all three phases) performance in both tasks. These beliefs could only be
elicited after the last phase. The second reason was to enhance the salience of the task-switching
environment. While the monetary advantage of the Automatic mode was clearly explained to
subjects during instruction, the absence of after-phase feedback prompted subjects to rely on how
22
An alternative implementation could be, e.g., to pay a higher piece rate for the Counting task and not pay
for the work done by the computer. However, in this implementation the monetary advantage of the Automatic
mode would be unclear, since it would depend entirely on subjects’ actual performance in the Counting task. In the
preferred implementation, the Automatic mode always yields higher earnings regardless of subjects’ performance on
the Counting task. The exact magnitude of the extra earnings does depend on performance.
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each mode felt rather than on the exact information about earnings.
The after-round feedback was omitted to ensure the independence of rounds. Providing afterround feedback could lead to situations when learning about the performance in one round affects
subsequent performance. Situations like these would complicate the evaluation of subjects’ actual
and perceived performance.
The payoff for the experimental task was determined by a computer that randomly selected
one phase out of three. This random selection mechanism ensures that subjects’ behavior in each
phase is incentive compatible in terms of performance on the real-effort tasks and the choice of
a preferred mode (Azrieli, Chambers, and Healy, 2018). The mechanism is frequently used in
experiments where subjects experience different institutions and then make a choice for the preferred
one (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007).

3.4

Treatments, Hypotheses, and Power

The experiment used a 2 × 2 full-factorial between-subject design. The first treatment arm was
automatability, which determined the probability of an easy Encryption task in each round. An
assigned value of automatability remained constant in every phase of the experimental task. The
automatability had two levels: 20% (low) and 80% (high). Proposition 4 (part 1) implies the
following testable hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1. The demand for the Automatic mode should be higher under high automatability
than under low automatability.
The second treatment arm was the order of modes that subjects experienced before making
their choices in the third phase. This treatment arm was introduced to explore a potential order
effect. The order treatment arm had two levels: AM (Automatic mode experienced first) and MA
(Manual mode experienced first). Theoretical model does not make any predictions about the order
effect, however, there could be behavioral mechanisms at play that would lead to such an effect.
The treatment assignment followed a completely randomized design (Selten, Friedman, and
Cassar, 2004). The computer randomized treatment assignment within a session on a subject
level. Table 1 shows the balance of subjects across the treatment cells. The target sample sizes
of approximately 63 subjects per value of a treatment arm were chosen to yield an 80% power to
22

detect a medium effect size (Cohen’s h = 0.5) at a 5% significance level. The actual sample sizes
differ slightly from those targets due to the completely random nature of treatment assignment.
Table 1: Treatment Balance
Order
Automatability

AM

MA

Total

0.2
0.8

35
31

29
33

64
64

Total

66

62

128

Note: The table shows the number of subjects in each treatment cell, as well as the total number of subjects
for each value of each treatment arm.

3.5

Questionnaire

After completing the experimental task, subjects participated in a questionnaire that contained
additional instruments aimed at exploring the determinants of choices beyond treatment variables.
I discuss these additional questions and the motivation for their inclusion below.

Questions about Choices
The first question asked subjects to explain the reasons behind their choices.23 The question was
administered at the start of the questionnaire. The answers to this question help evaluate how well
subjects’ own reasons match a priori motivations suggested by the theoretical model. Subjects
gave their answers as a free-form text, which was classified by an independent research assistant.24
The second question asked subjects whether they would revise their choices, if given an option to
do so. The question was administered after subjects received the feedback on their performance and
earnings, but before the final payoff was randomly selected. Subjects’ answers did not affect payoffs,
which was clearly explained. The answers to this question help assess the impact of feedback on
choices and provide insights into whether subjects’ choices were consistent.25
23

Textual analysis of reasons is an example of process data that gains popularity in economics (Cooper, Krajbich,
and Noussair, 2019). See Capra (2019) for examples and a discussion of protocol analysis in economics.
24
See Appendix E for the details of the classification procedure.
25
The answer to this hypothetical question, however, can either under- or overestimate the actual choice consistency.
Even if someone feels like they made a mistake, they might want stick to the original answer to preserve a good selfimage of themselves (Ewers and Zimmermann, 2015). This effect would bias the estimate of choice consistency
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Task Enjoyment and Beliefs
The enjoyment question asked subjects to rate their subjective enjoyment of the Encryption and
Counting tasks. The answers were given on a five-point Likert scale. Task enjoyment can be
thought of as a proxy for the intrinsic utility of working on a task. Since the intrinsic utility of a
task enters the overall value of a mode and can affect choice, it is important to control for it.
Belief questions asked subjects to guess their perceived accuracy (in percentage points) and mean
response time (in seconds) on the Encryption and Counting tasks. Since subjects made their choices
prior to seeing feedback, it was likely that beliefs about performance affected subjects’ choices.
Questions about the Encryption task were split by difficulty. Subjects had to consider only the
rounds they completed by themselves and the rounds in which they were not interrupted by the computer. The reports were incentivized using a quadratic scoring rule, presented as a schedule for clar
ity. The payoff for each belief question was determined as $1× 1 − 0.0025(actual value − report)2 ,
so that the maximum a subject could earn for each of the six belief questions was $1. Belief questions were not announced prior to the experimental task, hence it was impossible for subjects to
manipulate their performance to make sharp predictions during the belief elicitation.

Demographic Questions
This set of questions included the standard items: gender, age, ethnicity, marital status, year in
school, major, GPA, weekly expenditures, work on campus (wage and hours), family income level,
and religious affiliation. Gender was a particularly important characteristic to consider given the
prominence of a gender wage-gap in policy discussions. Studying the effect of gender on choices
helps address the question of whether automation would help to close this gap or make it wider.

Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT)
The CRT (Frederick, 2005) contained three standard questions, as well as a question about whether
subjects saw the CRT before. The CRT score shows subjects’ reliance on slow versus fast systems
in their decision-making and is related to cognitive flexibility. Since CRT is a measure of general
upwards. It is also possible that someone reports that they wished they could revise their choice, but in reality they
would choose the same thing, an effect similar to time-inconsistency. This effect would bias the estimate of choice
consistency downwards.
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intelligence, it could interact with subjects’ perceptions of benefits and costs of a given mode and
ultimately affect their choices.

Big Five
The Big Five questionnaire used a 50-question NEO-PI-R Domain inventory by Costa and McCrae (1992) made available via International Personality Item Pool (ipip.ori.org).26 The inventory
assesses the five personality domains (10 questions per domain): Openness to Experience, Conscientiousness, Extroversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism. The domain-specific questions were
presented in a random order with plus- and minus-keyed items alternating.
Big Five questions help explore whether certain types of personalities have a stronger preference
for either of the two modes. For example, people with high Openness to Experience are generally
willing to try out new things. If the Automatic mode is perceived as a novelty, subjects who score
highly on this trait would be more likely to choose the Automatic mode. For another example, one
might expect subjects who score highly on Neuroticism to be less likely to choose the Automatic
mode because they poorly handle the stress associated with task switching (Afshar et al., 2015).
Including these questions was important for two reasons. First, recent research in economics
suggests that personality traits play a role in subjects’ behavior in a labor market context (FilizOzbay et al., 2018). Second, companies often use personality tests as a part of their recruitment
practices. The existence of a relationship between personality and preferences for automation could,
therefore, inform the corporate policies on the adoption of automation technologies.

Risk and Time Preferences
The risk and time elicitation followed the design proposed by Falk et al. (2016) and recently used
in Falk et al. (2018). There were two parts for each type of preferences: a qualitative and a
quantitative part. The qualitative part asked subjects about their general tendency to either take
risks or delay gratification on a 10-point Likert scale. The quantitative part asked subjects to state
their hypothetical preference for either a sure amount versus a lottery (for a risk preference) or
a payment today versus a payment in the future (for a time preference). The quantitative part
was presented in an unfolding brackets format in which the next question depends on the previous
26

Borghans et al. (2008) provide an excellent discussion of the Big Five and the meaning of the domains.
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answer. The answers to the qualitative and quantitative parts were weighted using the weights in
Falk et al. (2018)[Appendix 1.I].
Attitudes towards risk and time potentially could be important determinants of subjects’ choices
in a labor context (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Corgnet and Hernán-González, 2019). While both
the Automatic and Manual modes involve uncertainty about an upcoming round, the uncertainty
embedded in the Automatic mode is arguably larger. Patience can affect choice since the Automatic
mode can be viewed as entailing a costly investment today that bears productivity gains in the
future.

3.6

Performance Measures

I compute several measures of performance on the Encryption and Counting tasks. I compute the
mean response time (RT) (average time needed to complete a round) and accuracy (the fraction of
rounds solved correctly) for each task using the data from the first two phases. In addition to the
observable performance measures, I estimate the structural measures of ability and motivation using
the methodology developed in Alekseev (2019). Ability is a measure of efficiency that represents
how quickly subjects can correctly solve a task, while motivation is a measure of intrinsic utility
that represents how much subjects care about correctly solving a task. Given that these structural
measures are simple non-linear transformations of mean RT and accuracy, I also derive the perceived
ability and motivation using subjects’ beliefs about mean RT and accuracy.

4

Results

4.1

Summary

I begin the analysis by looking at the unconditional distribution of choices in the sample. Figure 5
shows that the majority of subjects, 70%, chose the Automatic mode. Yet a non-trivial proportion
of subjects, 30%, chose the Manual mode. The frequency of the Automatic choice is significantly
greater than the frequency of the Manual choice (p−value < 0.001, Exact binomial test).27
The observed variation in subjects’ choices is inconsistent with the model in which subjects only
care about money. Recall that the Automatic mode always dominates the Manual mode in terms
27

All the statistical tests reported in the paper are two-sided, unless otherwise noted.

26

of earnings. If subjects only cared about money, everyone would have chosen the Automatic mode,
which is clearly not the case. The frequency of the Manual choice is also too high to be entirely
explained by choice errors on the part of subjects.28 Therefore, subjects must have considered
the costs associated with the Automatic mode, and for some subjects, these costs outweighed the
benefits of automation. The subsequent sections will explore the sources of the observed variation
in subjects’ choices.
Figure 5: Unconditional Distribution of Choices
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Note: The figure shows the frequencies of choices of each mode in the entire sample. The error bars show
the 95% confidence interval.

4.2

Treatment Effects

Automatability
The first potential candidate to explain the observed variation in subjects’ choices is automatability.
Figure 6a shows the distribution of subjects’ choices conditional on this treatment variable. Under
low automatability, the frequency of the Automatic choice is 61%. Under high automatability, the
frequency of the Automatic choice is 80%. This implies a positive average treatment effect (ATE)
of automatability on the Automatic choice of 18.75 percentage points (ppts) (Cohen’s h = 0.42,
medium effect size). The treatment effect is statistically significant (p−value = 0.033, Fisher’s
Exact Test for Count Data).
Result 1. The demand for the Automatic mode increases in automatability.
28

I elaborate on the point about potential choice errors in Section 4.4.
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Figure 6: Treatment Effect of Automatability
(a) Distribution of Choices
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Note: The figure shows the distribution of choices (left panel), as well as average earnings (right panel),
conditional on automatability. The error bars show the 95% confidence intervals.

The direction of the treatment effect is in line with the theoretical prediction and thus supports
Hypothesis 1. However, two quantitative features of Figure 6a deserve a closer inspection. First, not
everyone chose the Automatic mode under high automatability. The proportion of subjects who did
not choose the Automatic mode is, in fact, 20%. Such a high demand for the Manual mode under
high automatability is surprising, because subjects could earn substantially more money in the
Automatic mode than in the Manual mode. Figure 6b shows that by choosing the Automatic mode
under high automatability subjects could have more than doubled their earnings relative to the
Manual mode.29 One potential explanation for this result is that the huge monetary advantage of
the Automatic mode under high automatability was not salient enough for some subjects. Second,
the Automatic mode remains the dominant choice even under low automatability. This is surprising
because the simulation on Figure 3b suggests that the frequency of the Automatic choice should
be less than 50% when automatability is low. The data, on the other hand, clearly reject the
hypothesis that the frequency of the Automatic choice under low automatability is less than 50%
(p−value = 0.97, Exact binomial test). I explore these issues in more detail in Section 4.4.
29

Subjects could never earn less money in the Automatic mode than in the Manual mode by design.
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Order Effect
While the theoretical model does not make any predictions about the order effect, it is conceivable
that the mode order could affect subjects’ choices. For example, experiencing a given mode first
could create an anchor for this mode and thus make it more appealing. Under this hypothesis
subjects would tend to choose the Automatic mode at a higher rate in the AM order (Automatic
mode first) than in the MA order (Manual mode first). An alternative hypothesis could be that
subjects anchor on the mode they experience last. Under this hypothesis, subjects would tend to
choose the Automatic mode at a lower rate in the AM order than in the MA order. It is also possible
for both effects to be present in the sample. This would make the order effect less pronounced.
Figure 7 shows the distribution of subjects’ choices conditional on mode order. Under the AM
order, the frequency of the Automatic choice is 76%. Under the MA order, the frequency of the
Automatic choice is 65%. This implies a positive ATE of experiencing the Automatic mode first
on the Automatic choice of 11.24 ppts (Cohen’s h = 0.25, small effect size). The treatment effect,
however, is not statistically significant (p−value = 0.18, Fisher’s Exact Test for Count Data). This
suggests that either the order effect was weak in the sample or that the two opposing order effects
were present and canceled each other.
Result 2. The demand for the Automatic mode is not significantly affected by the mode order.
Figure 7: Distribution of Choices by Mode Order
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Note: The figure shows the distribution of choices conditional on the order in which modes were experienced. AM denotes that the Automatic mode was experienced first, MA denotes that the Manual mode was
experienced first. The error bars show the 95% confidence intervals.
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Regression
I conclude the discussion of treatments effects with a regression analysis. Table 2 shows the results of a logit regression with both treatment variables, as well as their interaction, included as
regressors.30 The regression results corroborate the results obtained from non-parametric tests.
Increasing automatability has a positive effect on the probability of the Automatic choice. Experiencing the Automatic mode last (MA order), on the other hand, appears to slightly reduce the
probability of the Automatic choice, however, the treatment effect is not statistically significant.
There is no evidence of the interaction between the two treatment variables.
Table 2: Logit Regression Results
Variable

Coefficient

SE

Statistic

p-value

Constant
Automatability
Order
Automatability × Order

0.651
1.259
-0.443
-0.486

0.434
0.549
0.358
0.619

1.499
2.294
-1.237
-0.784

0.134
0.022
0.216
0.433

Note: The table shows the estimation results from a logit model. The dependent variable is whether a
subject chose the Automatic mode. Automatability variable refers to the case when automatability is 0.8.
Order variable refers to the case when order is MA. The standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust (HC1)
and clustered on the session level.

4.3

Exploratory Analysis

Having established the causal effect of automatability on the propensity to choose the Automatic
mode, I turn to exploring which subjects’ characteristics could further explain the observed variation
in choices. The nature of the dataset suggests focusing on a predictive out-of-sample analysis as a
opposed to a more traditional explanatory within-sample analysis, for at least two reasons. The first
reason is a statistical one. The large number of potential predictors raises the issue of overfitting,
which occurs when a model successfully predicts the outcomes within sample but fails to predict
the outcomes out of sample. The second reason is a practical one. The predictive performance of a
model is more relevant, than explanatory performance, for designing policies and evaluating their
potential effects.
30

I estimate a long model, i.e., with the interaction term, following Muralidharan, Romero, and Wüthrich (2019).
Since the present experiment uses a full factorial design, ignoring the interaction term would result in incorrect
inferences.
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To conduct variable selection in a disciplined manner, I use the Lasso estimator, which is a standard tool in machine learning that is gaining popularity in economics (Varian, 2014; Mullainathan
and Spiess, 2017). The Lasso is a linear model that penalizes for the absolute magnitude of coefficients, shrinking some coefficients to exactly zero. While certainly being not as flexible as other
machine learning methods, such as, e.g., Random Forest, the Lasso is appealing for its tractability.
The Lasso serves as a convenient bridge between the modern machine learning techniques and a
standard economic analysis of effect sizes.

Estimation Strategy
I use a nested cross-validation (CV) algorithm (Varma and Simon, 2006; Krstajic et al., 2014) for
analysis. The algorithm consists of two loops: an outer loop and an inner loop. The outer loop
performs a repeated CV to obtain an unbiased estimate a model’s out-of-sample performance.31
All of the observations are split into k outer equally-sized subsets (folds). One of the folds is held
out as a test set used to evaluate the model’s out-of-sample performance, while the remaining folds
are used as a training set for model estimation and tuning. The process is repeated until all of the
k outer folds have been used as test sets. The splitting into folds is repeated nouter times to further
reduce the bias introduced by random splitting.
The inner loop applies to each of the training sets drawn at the outer loop. The Lasso has
a tuning parameter that determines the magnitude of the penalty. This parameter cannot be
estimated from the data, hence a repeated CV is used to tune it. The training set is split into
k inner folds. One of the folds is held out as an assessment set, while the remaining folds are used
as an analysis set for model estimation. The model is estimated for a grid of values of the penalty
parameter, and the model’s performance on the assessment set is estimated for each grid value. The
process is repeated until all of the k inner folds have been used as analysis sets. As in the outer loop,
the splitting into folds is repeated ninner times to further reduce the bias. The model’s performance
across all the assessment sets is averaged for each grid value, and the value of the tuning parameter
that maximizes the performance is used as the best value on a given test set.
Given that the distribution of outcomes in my dataset is highly skewed towards the Automatic
31

The bias in estimating the out-of-sample performance can become a real issue given the small number of observations in the dataset.
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mode, I use stratification when creating folds to preserve the distribution of the outcomes in each
fold (Kohavi, 1995). I use the area under the ROC curve (AUC) as a measure of a model’s
performance (DeLong, DeLong, and Clarke-Pearson, 1988; Bradley, 1997). AUC is the standard
performance measure in machine learning when the outcome variable is categorical. I set k outer =
4, k inner = 10, and ninner = nouter = 16, which results in a total of 10240 models being estimated.
The nested CV produces a distribution of performance estimates, as well as the distribution of
the best tuning parameters for the Lasso. I use the median value of the best tuning parameters to
estimate the Lasso on the full dataset and obtain the selected predictors.32 I then use the selected
predictors to estimate a standard logit model to get the effect sizes for the predictors.

Results
I begin by addressing the issue of overfitting formally and compare the out-of-sample performance
of the Lasso and the logit models. The logit models use all of the available predictors. The mean
AUC for the Lasso model is 0.69, while the mean AUC for the logit model is 0.62.33 The Lasso
performs better than the logit in 80% of the cases, and the average relative gain in the AUC is
10%. The difference in the performance between the two models is statistically significant (p−value
< 0.001, Wilcoxon signed rank test with continuity correction).
Figure 8 shows the estimation results from the logit model that only uses the predictors selected
by the Lasso. The subset of selected predictors, which has only 5 variables, is tiny compared to the
overall set of potential predictors, which has 48 variables. Among the selected predictors, all but
one are related to the Counting task. The only predictor not related to the Counting task is the
CRT score. The Counting task predictors include a measure of subjective task enjoyment, as well
as performance measures. Both subjective (beliefs) and objective (actual) performance measures
survive the selection process. The selected performance measures include the mean response time
(RT) and motivation. None of the measures of accuracy or ability survive the selection, which
suggests that when choosing a mode, subjects tend to care more about how quickly they can
perform a task rather than how well the can perform it. It is also important to note that among the
32

Note that I do not use the out-of-sample performance on the test sets to pick the best-of-the-best tuning parameter. Such a procedure would lead to overfitting.
33
A model with just a constant term has an AUC of 0.5, while the perfectly predictive model would have an AUC
of 1.
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predictors that did not survive the selection are all of the demographic, preferences, and personality
variables.
Result 3. The most important predictors of demand for the Automatic mode are Counting task
enjoyment and performance, as well as the CRT score.
Figure 8: Average Marginal Effects
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Note: The figure plots the estimated AMEs of the variables selected by the Lasso from a Logit regression.
Continuous variables are standardized. The horizontal bars are 95% confidence intervals (heteroskedasticityrobust (HC1), clustered at the session level). The dependent variable is whether a subject chose the Automatic mode.

Turning to effect sizes, we see that subjective task enjoyment has a particularly large and positive
effect on the propensity to choose the Automatic mode. This effect is intuitive and consistent
with the model’s predictions. A higher intrinsic utility of the Counting task, as proxied by task
enjoyment, leads to a higher payoff π B , which by Proposition 4 (part 4) should increase the demand
for the Automatic mode. The mean RT on the Counting task can theoretically affect the demand
for the Automatic mode via two channels. First, higher mean RT implies a higher effort requirement
b, which by Proposition 4 (part 5) should decrease the demand. Second, a subject with high mean
RT cannot complete as many trials of the Counting task as a subject with low mean RT, hence
higher mean RT implies lower payoff π B and thus should decrease the demand. The negative
33

effect of perceived motivation is somewhat counter-intuitive, given that higher motivation should
theoretically increase the payoff π B . However, higher motivation would also result in higher mean
RT, which has a negative effect on the demand. The overall negative effect of motivation suggests
that the latter negative effect (via higher mean RT) dominated the former positive effect (via higher
payoff). The effect of the CRT score can be understood through the lens of studies in psychology
on cognitive flexibility (Martin and Rubin, 1995; Chung, Su, and Su, 2012). If the CRT score is
negatively correlated with the switching costs, then Proposition 4 (part 3) would, indeed, imply
the positive effect of the CRT score on the demand for the Automatic mode.

4.4

Choice Reasons

In order to obtain additional insights into subjects’ behavior, I elicit subjects’ responses about the
reasons behind their choices. Figure 9 shows that the dominant reason for choosing the Automatic
mode was its earnings advantage. This reason was given by subjects 48% of the time (each subject
could give multiple reasons). Among other popular reasons were that the Automatic mode felt
faster, stated 21% of the time, and a closely related reason that the Automatic mode felt less
monotonous, stated 15% of the time.
The reasons for choosing the Manual mode were more idiosyncratic, as can be judged by the
size of the “other” category. One of the common reasons for choosing the Manual mode was the
desire to have enough time to work on the task. This reason was given 23% of the time. Other
reasons included a greater feeling of confidence, stated 17% of the time, and that subjects found it
easier to focus, stated 15% of the time.
Subjects’ responses leave the impression that subjects made well-motivated choices.34 Some of
the revealed reasons behind subjects’ choices, such as monetary benefits, are explicitly captured by
the theoretical model. Some other prominent reasons, however, are not explicitly captured by the
model and could not be recovered using choice data alone. Consider, for example, the two reasons
for choosing the Automatic mode classified as “not monotonous” and “much faster.”35 A potential
34
One might argue that some of the stated motives could not be that strong to reasonably justify a given choice,
but this would be a comment on whether subjects’ preferences are reasonable rather than on whether choices reflected
preferences, whatever these preference were.
35
The “much faster” reason can be related to the “earn more” reason, since being able to complete the task faster
results in higher earnings. However, it appears that subjects perceive these two reasons as distinct, as is evident from
their responses, and therefore, these two reasons represent different mechanisms.
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Figure 9: Choice Reasons
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Note: The figure presents the breakdown of choice reasons by categories for each mode choice. Subjects
could give multiple reasons for their choices.

interpretation of these reasons is that the task switching environment introduced by the Automatic
mode had unexpected effects on some subjects. Instead of increasing the disutility of those subjects
via higher switching costs, task switching increased their utility via a less monotonous work process.
This effect is consistent with the findings in the organizational psychology on the positive effect
of task variety for some workers (Zaniboni, Truxillo, and Fraccaroli, 2013). A less monotonous
work process is also often perceived as going fast (Loukidou, Loan-Clarke, and Daniels, 2009). The
model can incorporate such effects by allowing the switching costs to be negative for some subjects,
i.e., in these cases switching costs would turn into switching benefits.
The reasons for choosing the Manual mode are harder to map directly into the motivations
in the model. In part this is due to the large number of idiosyncratic reasons that fall under
the “other” category. The “easy focus” reason suggests that some subjects find it easier to focus
on tasks when tasks are of a single type. Easier focus can be interpreted as less difficulty with
completing the task and hence less effort. This effect is similar to the learning process assumed
in the model. The “more confident” reason can be related to the perceived accuracy of subjects’
performance on the tasks. If task switching reduces subjects’ confidence in the correctness of their
answers, subjects would need to put in more effort to make sure the tasks are solved correctly. This
effect is also reminiscent of the learning process. It would, however, be more accurately represented
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by a “negative learning” where the effort requirement increases whenever task switching occurs.
The “enough time” reason is related to the sense of time pressure in the Automatic mode. Even
though the model does not explicitly incorporate time pressure, the psychological stress induced
by time pressure can be captured in switching costs.
Result 4. The dominant stated reason for choosing the Automatic mode is its monetary advantage.
The majority of the stated reasons for choosing the Manual mode are idiosyncratic, however, many
of the reasons are related to learning.

4.5

Choice Consistency

Part of the reason why we observe lower-than-expected demand for automation in the high automatability treatment could lie in subjects’ misperception of costs and benefits of the two modes.
To explore this possibility, I turn to the analysis of subjects’ choice consistency. I elicit choice consistency by computing the proportion of subjects who answered that they would not revise their
choices. Recall that the question about whether a subject wished to revise his or her choice, if
given an option, was administered after learning the feedback on earnings in each mode. A subject
who initially underappreciated the magnitude of potential earnings in the Automatic mode could
update his or her beliefs accordingly after learning this feedback.
The majority of subjects, 88%, made consistent choices. Figure 10a shows, however, that choice
consistency varies dramatically by the chosen mode. Among subjects who chose the Automatic
mode, 97% made consistent choices. In contrast, among subjects who chose the Manual mode,
only 66% did so. The difference in the choice consistency between the chosen modes is large (30.88
ppts) and statistically significant (p−value < 0.001, Fisher’s Exact Test for Count Data).
Result 5. The average choice consistency is high. Choice consistency is substantially lower for
subjects who chose the Manual mode than for those who chose the Automatic mode.
Imperfect choice consistency raises the question about what would happen to the treatment
effect of automatability if subjects were allowed to revise their choices. Figure 10b addresses this
question by showing the distributions of “revised” choices conditional on automatability. The
demand for automation would go up under both values of automatability, however, the treatment
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Figure 10: Choice Consistency and “Revised” Treatment Effect
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Note: The figure shows the frequency of consistent choices by the chosen mode (left panel), as well as the
distribution of “revised” choices conditional on automatability (right panel). The error bars show the 95%
confidence intervals.

effect would be robust to this change.36 In fact, the treatment effect would increase up to 21.88
ppts (Cohen’s h = 0.55, medium effect size) and gain in statistical significance (p−value = 0.005,
Fisher’s Exact Test for Count Data).

5

Conclusion

In this paper, I have presented evidence that the welfare effect of complementary automation on
workers is not always positive compared to what is suggested by the current literature. Complementary automation does enable new, better tasks for workers and increase their productivity
and wages. However, new technologies are often imperfect, and these imperfections can impose
non-pecuniary costs on workers via a behavioral channel. The adoption of ”so-so technologies”
(Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2019), while productivity-enhancing from the viewpoint of management,
can, in reality, lead to net welfare losses for the workers who have to deal with such technologies
on a day-to-day basis, as the recent Walmart example illustrates.
I formalize this intuition in a model, inspired by the task-based framework of Acemoglu and
Restrepo (2018b). I show that the welfare effect of complementary automation is determined by the
36

It is interesting to note that, even allowing for the possibility to revise a choice, the demand for automation under
high automatability would be less than 100%.
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trade-off between the benefits and costs of automation. The benefits of automation in this setting
stem from new, better tasks enabled by the technology. The costs stem from the imperfection of
the technology that creates a task-switching environment. I use the model to identify several key
factors that can tip the balance of benefits and costs. The automatability of the production process
emerges as a particularly important factor. For a single agent, I show that the net welfare effect of
automation is determined by a threshold value of automatability. If the actual automatability of
the production process exceeds this threshold, the agent will always be better off with automation,
and vice versa. I also derive testable predictions for the demand for automation observed in a
sample of heterogeneous agents.
I test the model’s predictions and generate rich empirical data using an experiment. The experiment elicits subjects’ revealed preference for automation using a choice-from-experience design
(Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Hertwig and Erev, 2009). I vary the automatability of the production process between subjects and observe how this exogenous variation affects the demand for
automation. In line with the model’s predictions, increasing automatability does lead to a higher
demand for automation. I explore other potentially important predictors of the demand for automation using a machine learning analysis. Only a few such predictors emerge from a large set
of potential predictors, including demographic characteristics, risk and time preferences, personality traits, and task performance. In particular, measures of task enjoyment, performance, and
cognitive flexibility tend to be the strongest predictors of the demand for automation. The textual analysis of subjects’ reasons for their choices yields additional insights into the determinants
of the demand. The analysis reveals that some subjects enjoy a task-switching environment and
experience a positive effect of task variety instead of an adverse effect of task switching.
The theoretical and empirical analysis in this paper generates two new findings about the potential effects of complementary automation on workers. First, the net welfare effect of complementary
automation depends on the parameters of the environment, such as the automatability of the production process. In some environments, the net welfare effect of automation can become negative,
even when automation does generate productivity gains. The existence of behavioral effects that
arise when a worker interacts with the technology is what drives this result. Second, there is an
apparent heterogeneity of workers in terms of how much they benefit from automation. For example, subjects with higher cognitive flexibility are more likely to go with automation. Since cognitive
38

flexibility is associated with IQ, and higher IQ is associated with higher earnings (Acemoglu and
Autor, 2011), complementary automation, even when its effect is positive, can amplify welfare
inequality among workers.
These findings suggest that the future discussion of the potential effects of automation should
acknowledge behavioral factors. Acknowledging these factors will help design better policies that alleviate the potential adverse effects of imperfect automation. The introduced theoretical framework
offers several distinct ways to address these adverse effects. For example, increasing the monetary
payoffs for the new tasks enabled by automation or increasing their non-monetary attractiveness
can boost the net welfare effect of automation. Alternatively, one could focus on improving the
automatability of the environment or on how workers interact with technology. Designing automation technology in a way that reduces the switching costs for workers could be an essential tool
to increase the net welfare effect of automation. Comparing different compensation methods and
evaluating their effectiveness thus appears to be a promising direction for further research. Finally,
given the unequal distribution of the net welfare effects of automation among workers, it would be
crucial to identify the groups of workers who would benefit most from these compensation methods.
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Appendices
A

Proofs and Derivations

Proposition 1
Proof. The agent’s utility in period 1 conditional on history up to that point is
U (e | x1 , h1 , µ) = 1(e > ē1 (x1 ))π(x1 | µ) − c1 (e).
Suppose the agent exerts effort ē1 (x1 ) and considers a positive deviation, ∆e, from this level:
U (ē1 (x1 ) + ∆e | x1 , h1 , µ) = π(x1 | µ) − c1 (e + ∆e)
< π(x1 | µ) − c1 (e)
= U (ē1 (x1 ) | x1 , h1 , µ).
where the inequality follows since c is an increasing function. Hence, increasing effort beyond ē1 (x1 )
reduces the agent’s utility. Next consider a negative deviation, −∆e, from ē1 (x1 ):
U (ē1 (x1 ) − ∆e | x1 , h1 , µ) = −c1 (e − ∆e)
< π(x1 | µ) − c1 (e)
= U (ē1 (x1 ) | x1 , h1 , µ).
where the inequality follows because the participation constraint holds. Hence, decreasing effort
below ē1 (x1 ) reduces the agent’s utility. These two inequalities imply that e∗1 = ē1 (x1 ) is the level
of effort that maximizes the agent’s utility in period 1. The agent’s value in period 1 is then
U ∗ (x1 , h1 , µ) = π(x1 | µ) − c1 (ē1 (x1 )).
Next consider the agent’s total expected utility in period 0, given optimal behavior in period 1:
U (e | x0 , h0 , µ) + E U ∗ (X1 , h1 , µ) =
= 1(e > ē0 (x0 ))π(x0 | µ) − c0 (e) + E [π(X1 | µ) − c1 (ē1 (X1 ))] ,
where X1 denotes a random (from the perspective of period 0) task assigned in period 1. The
distribution of X1 conditional on a mode is given by equations (2) and (3). At e = ē0 (x0 ), the total
utility is


π(x0 | µ) − c0 (ē0 (x0 )) + E π(X1 | µ) − E c1 (ē0 (X1 ) − λē0 (x0 ) 1(H1 = η0 ))+ ,
where H1 denotes a random type of a task in period 1 that has the same distribution as X1 . A
positive deviation, ∆e, from ē0 (x0 ) yields a total utility of


π(x0 | µ) − c0 (ē0 (x0 ) + ∆e) + E π(X1 | µ) − E c1 (ē0 (X1 ) − λē0 (x0 ) 1(H1 = η0 ))+ ,
which is strictly less than the total utility at ē0 (x0 ) since the cost function is strictly increasing.
Note that the cost of effort in period 1 does not change since the min{ē0 (x0 ) + ∆e, ē0 (x0 )} in the
learning equation returns ē0 (x0 ). Hence, it is not optimal for the agent to exert more effort than
required in period 0. Now consider a negative deviation, −∆e, from ē0 (x0 ). It yields a total utility
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of


−c0 (ē0 (x0 ) − ∆e) + E π(X1 | µ) − E c1 (ē0 (X1 ) − λē0 (x0 ) 1(H1 = η0 ) + λ∆e 1(H1 = η0 ))+ .
(A.1)
This total utility is strictly less than the total utility at ē0 (x0 ) since the participation constrain
implies that
π(x0 | µ) − c0 (ē0 (x0 )) > −c0 (ē0 (x0 ).
Additionally, the expected cost of effort in period 1 in (A.1) is less than the expected cost of effort
in period 1 at e0 = ē0 (x0 ). When there is no learning, the two terms coincide. When there is
learning, however, a strict inequality holds. Hence, it is not optimal for the agent to exert less
effort than required in period 0. Together these results imply that e∗0 = ē0 (x0 ) is the level of effort
that maximizes the agent’s total expected utility in period 0, conditional on optimal behavior in
period 1. The agent’s value in period 0 is then
U ∗ (x0 , h0 , µ) = π(x0 | µ) − c0 (ē0 (x0 )).

Value Difference
Here I derive some of the expressions and results for the value difference between the Automatic and
Manual modes, ∆V , for an arbitrary value of λ. Using the schemes of the Manual and Automatic
modes, it is easy to derive the following expression for ∆V :
h
i
∆V = p π B − c0 (b) + c0 (al )
h
i
+ p(1 − p) π B − c0 (b) + c0 ((al − λah )+ ) − s
h
i
+ p(1 − p) c0 (ah − λal ) − c0 (ah ) − s
h
i
+ p2 π B − c0 (b − λb) + c0 (al − λal ) .
Collecting the terms with π B and p(1 − p), one obtains
h
i
∆V = 2pπ B + p c0 (al ) − c0 (b)
h
i
+ p(1 − p) c0 ((al − λah )+ ) + c0 (ah − λal ) − c0 (b) − c0 (ah ) − 2s
h
i
+ p2 c0 (al − λal ) − c0 (b − λb)
= p{2π B + c0 (al ) − c0 (b)
h
i
+ (1 − p) c0 ((al − λah )+ ) + c0 (ah − λal ) − c0 (b) − c0 (ah ) − 2s
h
i
+ p c0 (al − λal ) − c0 (b − λb) }
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Denote
A ≡ 2π B + c0 (al ) − c0 (b),
B ≡ c0 (b) + c0 (ah ) − c0 ((al − λah )+ ) − c0 (ah − λal ) + 2s,
C ≡ c0 (al − λal ) − c0 (b − λb).
Then the value difference can be written compactly as
∆V = (B + C)p (p − p∗ ) ,
where

A+C
.
(A.2)
B+C
It is easy to show that both A + C and B + C are strictly positive, hence p∗ < 1. For p∗ to be
positive, however, one must have A 6 B, which after a little algebra becomes
p∗ = 1 −

π B − c0 (b) 6 s +

c0 (ah ) − c0 (al ) − c0 ((al − λah )+ ) − c0 (ah − λal )
.
2

(A.3)

Then if condition (A.3) holds, the value difference will be negative for p 6 p∗ and positive for
p > p∗ . The value p∗ serves as a unique threshold that separates the agent’s choice of technology.
This result makes sense intuitively: if automatability of the production process is high enough, the
agent prefers the Automatic mode, and vice versa.
Consider condition (A.3). The LHS of it is the utility of task B net of the effort cost. The RHS
of it is the sum of the switching cost and half of the term that I refer to as the learning cost, l(λ).
Condition (A.3) has an intuitive interpretation: the net utility of the new task has to be lower than
the sum of the switching and learning costs. If the condition does not hold, i.e., the net utility of
the new task is high enough, p∗ will be negative and the agent will always prefer the Automatic
mode.
It is worth noting that the learning cost is not guaranteed to be positive. For example, l(0) =
−2c0 (al ) < 0. On the other hand, l(1) = c0 (ah ) − c0 (al ) − c0 (∆a), which is positive because of
the superadditivity of the cost function. In general, since l is a monotonically increasing function
of λ, there will be a unique value of learning λ∗ , such that l(λ) < 0 for λ < λ∗ and l(λ) > 0 for
λ > λ∗ . In other words, for the learning cost to be positive, the learning effect has to be strong
enough. The threshold λ∗ will depend on the effort requirements for tasks Al and Ah, as well as
on the shape of the cost function.
Using these results, it is now easy to prove Proposition 2.

Proposition 2
Proof. Consider formula (A.2). Putting λ = 1, one obtains
B = c0 (b) + c0 (ah ) − c0 (∆a) + 2s,
C = 0,
which implies that
p∗ = 1 −

2π B + c0 (al ) − c0 (b)
.
c0 (b) + c0 (ah ) − c0 (∆a) + 2s
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Putting λ = 1 in condition (A.3) yields
π B − c0 (b) 6 s +

c0 (ah ) − c0 (al ) − c0 (∆a)
.
2

Proposition 3
Proof. Assume that p ∈ (0, 1). Denote
B 0 ≡ c0 (b) + c0 (ah ) − c0 ((al − λah )+ ) − c0 (ah − λal )
The probability that agent i chooses the Automatic mode is
P(yi = 1) = P(∆Vi > 0)



= P p A − (1 − p)(B 0 + 2si ) + pC > 0

= P A − (1 − p)B 0 − 2(1 − p)si + pC > 0

= P 2(1 − p)si 6 A − (1 − p)B 0 + pC


p
A
0
−B +
C
= P 2s0 + 2σi 6
1−p
1−p



1
A
p
0
= P i 6
−B +
C − 2s0
2σ 1 − p
1−p

 
A
p
1
0
−B +
C − 2s0 .
=Φ
2σ 1 − p
1−p
Putting λ = 1 yields
B 0 = c0 (b) + c0 (ah ) − c0 (∆a)
C = 0,
which implies that

P(yi = 1) = Φ



1 2π B + c0 (al ) − c0 (b)
h
+ c0 (∆a) − c0 (b) − c0 (a ) − 2s0 .
2σ
1−p

If p = 0, we have
P(yi = 1) = P(∆Vi > 0) = P(0 > 0) = 1.
If p = 1, we have
P(yi = 1) = P(∆Vi > 0) = P(A + C > 0) = 1.
An alternative expression for the probability of choosing the Automatic mode can be obtained
as follows. Denote
B0 ≡ c0 (b) + c0 (ah ) − c0 ((al − λah )+ ) − c0 (ah − λal ) + 2s0 .
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Then


A
p
1
+
C − B0
P(yi = 1) = Φ
2σ 1 − p 1 − p


1
=Φ
[A + pC − (1 − p)B0 ]
2σ(1 − p)


1
=Φ
[A − B0 + p(B0 + C)]
2σ(1 − p)


B0 + C
∗
(p − p0 ) ,
=Φ
2σ(1 − p)


where
p∗0 ≡ 1 −

A+C
.
B0 + C

Putting λ = 1 yields

Φ

(c0 (ah ) + c0 (b) − c0 (∆a) + 2s0 )(p − p∗0 )
2σ(1 − p)

and
p∗0 = 1 −


,

2π B − c0 (b) + c0 (al )
.
c0 (ah ) + c0 (b) − c0 (∆a) + 2s0

Proposition 4
Proof. Let D ≡

1
2σ



A
1−p

− B0 +

p
1−p C


− 2s0 .

1. Consider the partial derivative of dA w.r.t. p
∂dA
A+C
= φ(D)
> 0.
∂p
2σ(1 − p)2
2. Consider the partial derivative of dA w.r.t. s0
φ(D)
∂dA
=−
< 0.
∂s0
σ
3. Consider the partial derivative of dA w.r.t. σ
∂dA
φ(D) (B0 + C)(p − p∗0 )
=− 2
∂σ
σ
2(1 − p)

(
6 0, p > p∗0 ,
> 0, p < p∗0 .

4. Consider the partial derivative of dA w.r.t. λ
∂dA
φ(D)
=
[−ah c00 (al − λah ) 1(al > λah ) − al c00 (ah − λal )
∂λ
2σ
p l 0 l
p
−
a c0 (a − λal ) +
bc0 (b − λb)].
1−p
1−p 0

A.5

If condition
p
p l 0 l
bc0 (b − λb) > ah c00 (al − λah ) 1(al > λah ) + al c00 (ah − λal ) +
a c (a − λal )
1−p 0
1−p 0
is satisfied, then
∂dA
> 0.
∂λ
5. Consider the partial derivative of dA w.r.t. π B
∂dA
φ(D)
=
> 0.
B
∂π
σ(1 − p)
6. Consider the partial derivative of dA w.r.t. b


φ(D) c00 (b)
p
∂dA
0
0
=−
+ c0 (b) +
(1 − λ)c0 (b − λb) < 0.
∂b
2σ
1−p
1−p
7. Consider the partial derivative of dA w.r.t. ah

∂dA
φ(D)  0 l
h
l
h
0
h
0
h
l
λc
(a
−
λa
)
1(a
>
λa
)
+
c
(a
)
−
c
(a
−
λa
)
< 0,
=
−
0
0
0
2σ
∂ah
since c00 is an increasing function.
8. Consider the partial derivative of dA w.r.t. al


∂dA
φ(D) c00 (al )
p
0
l
h
l
h
0
l
l
0
h
l
=
+ c0 (a − λa ) 1(a > λa ) +
(1 − λ)c0 (a − λa ) − λc0 (a − λa ) .
2σ
1−p
1−p
∂al
If condition
p
c00 (al )
+ c00 (al − λah ) 1(al > λah ) +
(1 − λ)c00 (al − λal ) > λc00 (ah − λal ),
1−p
1−p
is satisfied, then
∂dA
> 0.
∂al
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B

Subject Instructions

Note that subjects instruction were delivered on screen and [...] elements were replaced by actual
values generated by the software.
Introduction
Welcome and thank you for participating! This is an experiment in individual economic decisionmaking. Please, mute/turn off all of your electronic devices for the duration of the experiment.
Session overview
Today’s session will consist of two parts, Part A and Part B. The session will take up no more than
2 hours. You will proceed with the experiment at your own pace.
Payment
Your total payment will consist of a participation payment of $[...], a payment for the experimental
tasks, and a payment for the questionnaire. You will be paid privately in cash at the end of the
experiment.
Privacy
You will not interact with other participants. Please, do not reveal your identity to anyone. You
must not talk to other participants during the experiment.
Final Notes
Please read the following instructions carefully. You are welcome to ask questions at any point.
Just raise your hand and we will answer your questions in private.
Structure of experiment
The experiment consists of Part A and Part B. Part A of the experiment is split into three Phases.
In the first Phase, you will encounter the so-called [...] mode. In the second Phase, you will
encounter the so-called [...] mode. In the third Phase, you will first be given an option to make a
choice between the two modes. This choice will determine under which mode you will work in the
third Phase. The meaning of the two modes will be explained shortly.
Manual mode
In the Manual mode, you will work on the Encryption task. In the Encryption task, you will need
to find correct matches between letters and numbers. In each round, you will see 18 pairs of letters
and numbers arranged in a table (the Key) at the upper part of the screen. Below the Key, there
will be a smaller table with letters and empty input boxes (the Lock). Your goal is to fill in the
boxes in the Lock with numbers according to the Key. You will fill in the boxes by typing numbers
on your keyboard.
The Lock will contain either 3 (3-item Lock) or 6 (6-item Lock) empty boxes. The computer
will decide before the start of each round whether you will be given a 3-item or a 6-item Lock.
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The chance that you will be given a 6-item Lock in any given round is [...]%. This means that, on
average, every [...] out of five rounds will have a 6-item Lock.
After filling in the boxes as you see fit, you will need to click Submit to proceed to the next
round. You will complete the task at your own pace. There will be [...] rounds of the task. A
round will be considered as correctly solved if all the boxes in the Lock are filled in according to
the Key. You will learn your score at the end of the experiment. You will receive $[...] for each
correctly solved round.
Automatic mode
In the Automatic mode, the computer will help you with the Encryption task. The computer will
be able to help you with the 3-item Lock, but not with the 6-item Lock. Here is how it works. As
in the Manual mode, the computer will decide before the start of each round whether the round
will have a 3-item or a 6-item Lock. If the round turns out to have a 6-item Lock (recall that there
is a [...]% chance of that happening), you will work on the Encryption task with a 6-item Lock, as
before. However, if the round turns out to have a 3-item Lock, the computer will correctly solve
this round for you. It will take [...] seconds for the computer to correctly solve the round. You, in
the meantime, will have a chance to work on the Counting task.
In the Counting task, you will need to count the number of happy faces in a table of [...] happy
and frowny faces. You will enter your answer in the empty input box by typing the number using
your keyboard. After filling in the box as you see fit, you will need to click Submit to proceed to
the next round. If you click Submit before the computer ends working on a 3-item Lock, you will
proceed to a new round of the Counting task. If the computer finishes working on a 3-item Lock
before you click Submit in the Counting task, one of the two things will happen.
First of all, the computer will decide whether the next round of the Encryption task will have
a 3-item or a 6-item Lock. If the round turns out to have a 3-item Lock, the computer will proceed
with that round, and you will continue working on your current Counting task. If, however, the
round turns out to have a 6-item Lock, the computer will have to interrupt your work on the
Counting task and ask you to solve the 6-item Lock.
There will be [...] rounds of the Encryption task, during which you can work. You will be able
to complete as many rounds of the Counting task as you can, while the computer works on 3-item
Locks. The Automatic mode will finish after the [...]th round of the Encryption task is finished
either by you or the computer.
You will learn your score at the end of the experiment. You will receive $[...] for each correctly
solved round of the Counting task, $[...] for each correctly solved round of 6-item Encryption task,
and $[...] for each round of a 3-item Encryption task (the computer always solves these rounds
correctly for you).
Practice
You will have [...] practice rounds of each task before Phase 1 begins. This will give you a chance to
familiarize yourself with the interfaces of the tasks. During the practice, you will receive feedback
on your performance. You will receive no feedback on your performance in the further rounds.
Choice Phase
At the beginning of the third Phase, you will be given an option to choose under which mode you
would like to work for the last Phase of Part A. If you choose the Manual mode, you will work
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according to the rules of the Manual mode for [...] rounds. If you choose the Automatic mode, you
will work according to the rules of the Automatic mode for [...] rounds.
Part B
After finishing the third Phase, you will proceed to Part B of the experiment. In Part B, you will
be given a questionnaire that consists of several parts. You will be asked to answer the questions
in the questionnaire to proceed.
End of experiment and payment
After you complete the questionnaire, you will see your results from all the Phases: the Phase with
the Manual mode, the Phase with the Automatic mode, and the Phase with the mode of your
choice. The computer will pick at random one Phase out of those three for the final payment.
Each Phase will be equally likely to be picked by the computer. You will not know which Phase
determines your earnings for the experiment when you go through the three Phases. It makes
sense, therefore, to perceive each Phase as if it were the one that determines your earnings. The
last screen will show you which Phase was chosen for your payment by the computer, and your
earnings in the experiment.
If you have any questions about the experiment, please raise your hand, and we will help you
in private. If you are ready to proceed to the task, click Proceed to begin the practice rounds.
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Screenshots
Figure C.1: Encryption Task in the Manual Mode

Note: The figure shows an example of an Encryption task with 3 items in the Manual mode.
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Figure C.2: Counting Task

Note: The figure shows an example of a Counting task in the Automatic mode.
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Figure C.3: Encryption Task in the Automatic Mode

Note: The figure shows an example of an Encryption task in the Automatic mode. The Encryption task
in the Automatic mode always had 6 items. The message at the top of the screen indicates that subjects’
previous work on the Counting task was interrupted.
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Additional Tables
Table D.1: Demographic Characteristics of the Sample
Characteristic

Mean

Gender and Age
Female
Male
Age
Race

0.58
0.42
21.34

Asian
Black
Hispanic
Other
White
Year in School

0.21
0.01
0.15
0.08
0.55

Freshman
Sophomore
Junior
Senior
Graduate
Major

0.03
0.10
0.26
0.60
0.01

Arts
Business
Economics
Other
STEM

0.36
0.21
0.04
0.21
0.19
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Textual Analysis

The notes below explain the classification criteria and sample answers for each reason category.

Manual Mode
• dislike smiley face: Subjects do not like smiley face. Subject 81: “Looking at the smiley/frowny faces felt like it was tricking my mind.”
• enough time: Subjects think they have enough time to finish the task. Subject 90: “Because
I felt very rushed during the Counting part for the Automatic mode. I felt like it was better
for me to feel calm and composed while doing the Manual mode and take my time on the
coding part.”
• easy focus: Subjects think it is not easy to be distracted in this mode. Subject 119: “I found
it easier to focus on one task as opposed to switching between two different ones.”
• more confident: Subjects think that they can do it more correctly. Subject 127: “Know I can
do it right.”
• more efficient: Subjects think that it is more efficient under this mode. Subject 86: “I felt I
was more efficient in just looking for the letter and copying the number.”
• more control: subjects think that they have more control in this mode. Subject 83: “I knew
I missed a round or two in automatic, whereas I had more control over the rounds in manual.
I knew I could get all the rounds correct in manual.”
• thinking consistency: Subjects do not want to change their mind between different modes.
Subject 89: “I didn’t want to switch between thinking modes.”

Automatic Mode
• challenge themselves: Even realizing that it is hard, subjects want to challenge themselves.
Subject 155: “I chose the Automatic mode because I thought it was more challenging to
switch between encryption task and counting task. I wanted to challenge myself and see how
many I could still get right, even if it was more of a headache”
• earn more: Subjects think they can earn more money. Subject 112: “Although it was harder,
you are guaranteed more money”.
• like smiley face: Subjects like to count smiley face. Subject 118 “I preferred counting smiley
faces over inputting encryptions.”
• much faster: Subjects think it’s much faster in this mode. Subject 140: “It’s faster to count
the faces than inputting numbers”
• more correct: Subjects think some tasks in this mode will be more correct if it is done by
computers. Subject 138 “I trusted the computer more than myself.”
• not monotonous: Subjects think automatic mode is not as tedious as manual mode. Subject
135: “Typing in everything manually got very tedious after a while. When the smiley faces
came up, it gave me a brain break and it felt like a game.”
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